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Introduction 
“For all future weapons systems that DoD will acquire or 
procure, DoD will mandate specific cybersecurity standards 
for weapons systems to meet. Acquisition and procurement 
policy and practice will be updated to promote effective 
cybersecurity throughout a system’s life cycle.”  
 
- DOD moving toward holding contractors liable 
- Is now the best time to add contractor risk? 
- Is this enough? 
- Minimum standard 












Cyber Risk to Military Missions 
• If adversary can hack into mission essential software/hardware, then mission is compromised 
• Mission assurance requires materiel solutions, educated personnel (acquisition & operators), and TTPs 
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Known Software Vulnerabilities 
Degree of mission compromise 
Disruption Failure 
4 
Spectrum of Cyber Operations 
Very stealthy                        Less stealthy 
Access Operations 
• Digital intelligence 
(e.g., stealthy implant) 
Disruption  Attack 
• Use of force 
• Physical damage 
or destruction 
• Physical injury 
or death 
•Interrupt the flow of information or function 
of information systems without physical 
damage or injury 
Motivating Contractor Efforts 
 
- Contractors have different priorities than the DOD when it comes to cybersecurity 
- Classic example 
- Manager’s huge office 
- In another defense context 
- Cost-reimbursement contracts 
 
- Why is this the case? 
- Contractor can satisfy client through other achievements 
- DOD has not clearly communicated importance 
 
 
Motivating Contractor Efforts 
- Government’s problem: Outcomes to avoid? 
- Minimize: 
- Expected payments to contractors plus 
- Expected cost of hacking 
 
- Subject to: 
- Contractor participation constraint 
- Contractor chooses government’s 
favored level of effort 
 
- Results 
- Fee for successful protection 
- Penalty for breach 
Motivating Contractor Efforts 
- Implications 
- Incentives Depend on: 
- Probability of success 
- Marginal cost of effort 
- Marginal benefit of effort 
 
- Need a more functional way to set 
incentives 
 
- How to administer incentives? 
- Incentive fees 
- Award fees 
Choosing the Right Contractors 
- Less expensive contractors likely to win contract over those with strong 
cybersecurity commitment and practices 
- Classic example: 
- “Market for Lemons” 
- In another defense context: 
- Sealed bids 
 
- Why is this the case? 
- Cybersecurity is considered a constraint 







Choosing the Right Contractors 
- What to do about it? 
 
- Screening 
- Actively consider cybersecurity 
when awarding contract 
- Difficult when you have so many 
objectives 
 
- Encourage signaling 
- Foster metric development 
Choosing the Right Contractors 
- More specifically 
 
- Screen by system sensitivity 
- Boost incentives 
- Require higher quality scores 
 
- Quality scores 
- Historical system protection 
- Vulnerability Assessment/Penetration Testing 
- Weakness and Vulnerability scores 











Effectiveness of Incentives? 
- Long history of incentives in DOD 
 
- Empirical results 
- GAO (1999-2003) 
- Incentives not particularly helpful  
- Recommendations 
 
- 2014 Performance of DOD Acquisition System 
















- Detection Lag and Uncertainty 
- Alternate signals 
 
- Adversarial behavior 
 
- Setting appropriate fee 

















- Move beyond a compliance mindset 
 
- Economic theory calls for cybersecurity incentives 
- Truly makes cybersecurity a priority 
- Size based on system sensitivity 
- Monitor profit margins/perverse behavior 
 
- Lack of metrics is an obstacle 
- Encourage creativity through rewards 
- Information sharing important 
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